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Abstract
In this work, we examine why a popular anonymity network, Tor, is vulnerable
to timing side-channel attacks. We explore removing this vulnerability from Tor
without sacrificing its low-latency which is important for usability.
We find that Tor is vulnerable because inter-packet delays propagate along the
network path from the source to the destination. This provides an easily detected
signature. We explore techniques for making the timing signature either expensive or
impossible to detect.
If each packet took a unique, disjoint path from source to destination the
inter-packet delay signature would be undetectable. Jitter and latency would change
packet arrival orders. This is impractical since the overhead for constructing these
circuits would be prohibitive. We scaled this idea back to reflect how the BitTorrent
protocol creates a large number of possible paths from a small number of nodes.
We form a fully connected network with the source, destination, and a small
number of nodes. The number of paths through this network from source to destina-
tion grows quickly with the addition of each node. Paths do not have to include every
node, so the delay of each path is different. By transmitting consecutive packets on
different paths, the network delays will mask the inter-packet delay signature.
ii
Dedication
To my family, for being there always.
iii
Acknowledgments
Foremost, I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Richard R. Brooks. With-
out your guidance and assistance my work would not have been possible. Our
conversations have always been thought-provoking and your recommendations well-
intentioned. You have imparted a lasting impression of how to approach the chal-
lenging issues present in computer security.
I would also like to thank Dr. Kuang-Ching Wang and Dr. Robert J. Schalkoff
for serving on my committee and for your interesting courses. While I have not used
all the concepts presented in your classes in this work, they have proved invaluable
in looking at computer security problems from a different angle.
I have also had the privilege of working alongside and after a talented group
of students in our research group. My work would not have been possible without
the previous work done by Jason Schwier and Ryan Craven. Being able to converse
and exchange ideas with the current research group has been an enriching experience
and assisted me more that I thought possible.
Finally, I would like to thank the Holcombe Department of Electrical and
Computer Engineering. The monetary assistance from my teaching assistantship was
a blessing, and the staff and faculty were excellent. I will remember my interactions
with them forever.
This material is based on research sponsored by the Air Force Research Labora-
iv
tory, under agreement number AFD-080228-008. The U.S. Government is authorized
to reproduce and distribute reprints for Governmental purposes notwithstanding any
copyright notation thereon. The views and conclusions contained herein are those
of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official
policies or endorsements, either expressed or implied, of the Air Force Research Lab-
oratory or the U.S. Government.
v
Table of Contents
Title Page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
Dedication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Anonymous Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Traffic Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Research Question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4 Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1 Anonymity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 Tor Anonymity Assumptions (Attack Models) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3 OnionCat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4 Side Channel Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.5 Known Attacks on Tor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.6 CSSR Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3 Theoretical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.1 New Anonymity Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.2 Classification Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.3 Number of Routes to Destination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.4 Delays of Routes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.5 Expected Effects on Inter-Packet Times . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.6 Effects on CSSR Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
vi
4 Experimental . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.1 Delays in OnionCat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.2 Testing Our Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.3 Implementation Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
5.1 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
5.2 Recommendations for Further Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
A Derivation of Classification Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
vii
List of Tables
2.1 Transitions required to distinguish between models . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.1 Total Number of Paths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.1 OnionCat Response Times (ms) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.2 Delays used by sender (ms) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.3 Acceptance and rejection rates with 0 nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.4 Acceptance and rejection rates with 1 node . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.5 Acceptance and rejection rates with 2 nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.6 Acceptance and rejection rates with 3 nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.7 Acceptance rates for up to 3 nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.8 Rejection rates for up to 3 nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
viii
List of Figures
2.1 Example Tor circuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2 Example of two users communicating in Tor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3 Example of a circuit in OnionCat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4 Example of a CSSR generated hidden Markov model . . . . . . . . . 21
2.5 Underflow from maximum likelihood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.6 Two different models with same state structure . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.1 Network architecture supporting multiple paths through Tor . . . . . 26
3.2 Multiple paths multiplexed into a single channel . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.3 Classification of two Gaussian random variables . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.4 Number of paths versus number of nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.5 Inter-arrival time distributions for 2 paths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.1 Capturing data pings between OnionCat clients . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.2 Normalized OnionCat Ping Times Compared to Standard Normal Dis-
tribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.3 5 state model used for delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.4 Inter-packet delays with 0 nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.5 Reconstructed model from received delays with 0 nodes . . . . . . . . 45
4.6 Inter-packet delays with 1 node . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.7 Reconstructed model from received delays with 1 node . . . . . . . . 48
4.8 Inter-packet delays with 2 nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.9 Reconstructed model from received delays with 2 nodes . . . . . . . . 50
4.10 Inter-packet delays with 3 nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.11 Reconstructed model from received delays with 3 nodes . . . . . . . . 53
4.12 Acceptance rates versus number of nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55




Computer and network security typically refers to the confidentiality, integrity,
availability and assurance of resources and data. These topics have been and continue
to be widely investigated to ensure computers and networks provide acceptable levels
of security to their users. While these properties are important to the user, they do
nothing to provide or ensure the user’s anonymity.
There have been many diverse strategies throughout history for covert commu-
nication. These techniques largely involve modifying the transport layer to physically
hide the communication from potential threats. However, we are unable to modify
the transport layer and instead are forced to use some form of mix network. Mix net-
works were first proposed by Chaum and are networks that use secure proxy chains
to transmit data [10].
Applications for these types of networks exist in both the military and civilian
sectors. The military utilizes these networks to hide the originating and receiving
party’s identity and location from their adversaries. Civilians utilize them to better
protect their privacy when publishing or transmitting sensitive information, such as
health, tax, or banking records. These networks can also help to better protect
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organizations and users from persecution and circumvent censorship tools such as the
“great firewall” [16].
In both of these cases, there exist powerful and motivated adversaries that
wish to determine the identity of the various users. It is the subject of this thesis to
study and improve anonymous communication networks, with the goal of providing
stronger anonymity to their users.
1.1 Anonymous Communication
Current anonymous networks provide users with the ability to communicate
while hiding their identity and location from other parties. The anonymity they
provide does not ensure privacy though. Users must undertake additional measures
to ensure their communication is private.
Many of the anonymous networks use some form of proxying to provide users
anonymity. Instead of directly sending traffic from one user to another, the networks
bounce the traffic from one user through some set of nodes before sending it to the
other user. This prevents the header information of the traffic from containing both
the source and the destination. Depending on which network is used, it is possible
that no individual node knows both the source and destination. These networks can
also employ other techniques to protect user anonymity, such as:
• Padding packets to a fixed length
• Mixing packet flows
• Batching or controlling packet flow rates
• Sending dummy traffic
2
Depending on how the networks implement different combinations of these
options, they are classified as either low-latency or high-latency. The high-latency
networks offer better protection against traffic analysis1. These networks generally
have strong mixing, batching, and reordering algorithms that eliminate information
used in traffic analysis at the cost of adding large delays to individual packets [27].
This extra delay makes the high-latency networks a poor choice for interactive commu-
nication. On the other hand, the low-latency networks which can support interactive
communication implement fewer of these additional techniques. As a result, they
provide less protection against traffic analysis.
High-latency networks are typically called remailers. Mixmaster [28] and
Mixminion [15] are two examples of this type of network. These are well suited for
sending anonymous email or posting anonymous messages to message boards or orga-
nizations. The low-latency networks are typically called anonymous overlay networks
or Onion Routing (OR) networks. The Onion Router (Tor) [18], Invisible Internet
Project (I2P) [23], and Java Anon Proxy (JAP or JonDonym) [6] are examples of this
type of network. These are well suited for interactive communication such as SSH,
HTTP, or various P2P protocols.
1.2 Traffic Analysis
Attackers are often unable to view unencrypted digital communication. The
use of encryption or code words has become more popular outside of the military
sector as encryption algorithms have become better understood, better implemented
and easier to use [14]. As a result, attackers have to use other methods to determine
information about their adversary’s communication.
1Traffic analysis uses patterns found in intercepted communication to determine information
about the communicators.
3
Traffic analysis is one method attackers can use to do this. The roots of traffic
analysis can be traced back to World War One and has had an impact in many military
conflicts since [26]. Consequently, the military has devoted considerable resources to
improving their traffic analysis methods and securing their communication methods
against them. The growth in popularity of personal computers and the internet made
the use of traffic analysis possible in the civilian sector.
Even though the attacker cannot directly see the communication between
users, the attacker can still possibly determine various facts about traffic:
• Packet headers
• Packet lengths
• Timing between packets
The attacker can collect these bits of information. By themselves, the bits may tell
the attacker very little. If the attacker is able to piece all of the bits together from a
single traffic flow, then the attacker can determine larger pieces of information about
the users [19], such as:
• Who is talking to whom
• Where the users are located
• When the users communicate
• What applications or protocols are being used
• How much data is being communicated
When the user is communicating sensitive information, keeping these details private is




Recent advances in pattern recognition [34, 35] have made more sophisticated
traffic analysis and side-channel attacks possible [7, 13]. These new attacks represent
new threats to digital communication and propose unique challenges to the users of
anonymous communication networks. We ask, what can be done to help strengthen
user anonymity in these networks?
We focus our research on Tor. Recent work shows that the threat to Tor’s
anonymity is real [13]. This attack matches a session’s source to its sink by the inter-
packet delay signature in the communication protocol. We consider the underlying
vulnerability to be using point-to-point connections for anonymous sessions.
We propose having sessions interleave multiple paths to modify this signature
and maintain Tor’s low-latency, which is important for usability. This idea is inspired
from the BitTorrent protocol creating a large number of paths among a small number
of nodes. Each path will have a different latency and jitter. By using different paths to
transmit consecutive packets, the network will mask the inter-packet delay signature
of the protocol and make it more difficult or impossible to detect.
Now, our question is can we model this idea to better understand it? Also, can
we implement our design and measure its effect on the inter-packet delay signature?
1.4 Organization
Previous sections in Chapter 1 outline the motivation behind our work. Users
require stronger protection as traffic analysis has grown more powerful. We present
our research question of how we can better protect anonymous communication net-
works against traffic analysis.
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Chapter 2 explains background material. We look at what anonymity is and
how Tor provides anonymity. We examine attacks on Tor and why Tor is vulnerable
to attack. OnionCat is discussed since it allows a wide range of applications to use
anonymous communication networks. Side-channel attacks are examined, particularly
the Tor side-channel attack we hope to disable.
Chapter 3 describes our method for protecting Tor from side-channel attacks.
We develop a mathematical model to represent our method and protocols it should
protect. The effect of adding additional nodes is quantified and the number of paths
a set of nodes form is calculated. We also examine how the varying network delays
will affect the inter-packet delay signature and the effect this will have on the CSSR2
algorithm.
Chapter 4 describes our channel implementation and the experimental results.
We collect data to justify several of our assumptions in developing the mathematical
model. The signatures at the source and receiver ends of our channel are captured
using different number of nodes to form the paths. This data is used by the side-
channel attack to demonstrate the effect the channel has on the signature.
Chapter 5 contains a summary of our results and the conclusions we were
able to draw from them. We also suggest interesting ideas and questions to continue
investigating.




Tor is a distributed, anonymous communications network, which focuses on
providing users with anonymous, private web browsing [2]. Because the network is
fast enough for web browsing, it is vulnerable to sophisticated timing attacks [43].
The focus of our research is to design and build a network within Tor that is both
fast enough for general web browsing and eliminates the vulnerabilities from these
timing attacks.
2.1 Anonymity
In everyday use, the word anonymous has several meanings but commonly
refers to an object of unknown origin[1]. Converting this definition into technical
terms for digital communication is not a trivial task but is one undertaken in [33],
where anonymity is divided into three parts – sender anonymity, recipient anonymity
and unlinkability of sender and receiver.
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2.1.1 Anonymity Set
One way to determine sender and recipient anonymity is through the use of
the anonymity set first proposed in [10]. For sender anonymity, the anonymity set
is the subset of participants that may have originally sent the message. For receiver
anonymity, the anonymity set is the subset of participants that may be the final
destination of the message. Both of these are reasonable metrics for logicians and
cryptographers.
While the anonymity set allows us to qualify anonymity, it does not make it
easy to quantify the results. [36] has proposed the use of the entropy function to help





where Ψ is the set of users and pu is the probability user u originally sent the message.
Using this metric, larger values of S mean the sender has more anonymity.
2.1.2 Unlinkability
The term unlinkability means that a posteriori knowledge gained from observ-
ing the message pass through the system does not change the probability that the
sender and recipient can be linked together [25]. One important distinction to make
is this does not mean the message passing through the system is unobservable, simply
that there are no observable qualities in the message that link sender to recipient.
This gives us another way to qualify anonymity in any system. For anonymity
to exist, both the sender and recipient must remain unlinkable. So for each message
passing through the system, the message must not be linked to both the sender and
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the recipient. The anonymity set is one way to measure the link between the message
and the sender. It also tells us that the act of sending the message through the system
must not link the sender and recipient together.
This last item is one that many side channel attacks focus on exploiting. Con-
sequently, it is also one we will focus on strengthening in our research.
2.2 Tor Anonymity Assumptions (Attack Models)
The Tor network is a distributed, anonymous overlay network. It provides
users with anonymous, private communication channels usable for a variety of ac-
tivities. Privacy for user data is easily obtained by using cryptography. This makes
the data almost impossible to read without the decryption key, but unfortunately
does nothing to make the transaction anonymous. Even though data is encrypted,
the routing information is still available in cleartext. From this information, attack-
ers can use traffic analysis to determine various facts about the session, such as the
sender, receiver, size and so forth.
Tor provides anonymity by ensuring both the sender and receiver cannot be
determined from routing information. It does this by creating a tunnel through the
network for the data packets. When the sender wants to send a data packet to some
user, Tor encapsulates the packet within another packet for each node in the tunnel.
By doing this, no node within the tunnel knows who the sender and the receiver are.
If the receiver tries to send a packet back, the packet will travel the opposite way
through the tunnel and then be sent to the sender.
9
Figure 2.1: Example Tor circuit
2.2.1 Construction of a Tor Circuit
The sender’s Tor client is responsible for constructing the circuit. It does
this with the aid of a directory server, which contains a list of all the Tor routers
currently operating and what type of connections they will support. The sender
begins by picking three routers to build its circuit, and begins the circuit with the
first router. This step involves exchanging keys with the first router and setting up
an encrypted tunnel between the two nodes (sender and router 1).
Once the first tunnel has been established, the sender tells the first router to
extend the circuit to the second router. The first router exchanges keys with the
second and sets up an encrypted tunnel between the two routers. Once this tunnel
is established, the first router tells the sender it was successful and the key for the
second router.
The sender then tells the second router to extend the circuit to the third
router. It does this by sending a command through the partially built circuit. The
second and third routers then exchange keys. The confirmation and key are sent back
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up the circuit to the sender. Once the sender has confirmed the three router circuit
it can begin to use the circuit to send data to some receiver. Traffic is sent down
the channel by encapsulating packets and having each router use its key to remove a
layer of encryption before sending the packet further down the circuit. An illustrated
example is now given of this process.
2.2.2 Sending and Receiving Data in Tor
After the circuit is constructed, the sender (Alice) knows the keys for each
router in the circuit (TorNode1, TorNode2, and TorNode3). Alice can also establish
a key with the receiver (Bob), and use it to encrypt their communication. It is im-
portant to note that Tor provides anonymity, not privacy. If Alice sends unencrypted
messages to Bob, the last router in the circuit and anyone spying on the connection
after that point will be able to read the message.
To send a message to Bob, Alice begins by constructing a packet with her
message from TorNode3 to Bob. She then encrypts this packet with the key for
TorNode3 and uses this as the data for a packet from TorNode2 to TorNode3. She
then encrypts this packet with the key for TorNode2 and uses this as the data for a
packet from TorNode1 to TorNode2. Finally, she encrypts this packet with the key
for TorNode1 and uses this as the data for a packet from Alice to TorNode1.
Alice sends the packet to TorNode1, who uses its key with Alice to decrypt the
packet and finds a packet that it needs to send to TorNode2. TorNode2 receives this
packet from TorNode1 and decrypts it with its key and finds a packet it needs to send
to TorNode3. TorNode3 receives this packet from TorNode2 and decrypts it with its
key and finds a packet it needs to send to Bob. Bob then receives the packet from
TorNode3, and has no idea Alice sent it unless Alice has told him so in the message.
11
Figure 2.2: Example of two users communicating in Tor
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If Bob wants to send a packet back to Alice, he has to send it back through
the Tor circuit. Let’s say Bob is a web server and Alice has requested some web page
she wants to access anonymously. Bob doesn’t know it was Alice who requested the
page; he received the request from TorNode3. Bob replies to TorNode3 who encrypts
the reply with its key and sends the encrypted response up the circuit to TorNode2.
TorNode2 receives the packet from TorNode3, encrypts it with its key and sends it
up the circuit to TorNode1. TorNode1 receives the packet from TorNode1, encrypts
it with its key and sends it up the circuit to Alice. Alice receives this packet and then
uses the three keys to decrypt it, and finds the web page she requested from Bob.
2.2.3 Assumptions and Vulnerabilities
Tor’s solution to anonymity is vulnerable to the exit node in the tunnel being
compromised by the attacker, meaning the attacker controls the node or can watch
all traffic passing through the node. If the attacker has compromised this node, then
the attack knows who the destination is and can possibly see the message in cleartext.
Then the attacker can try to collude with other nodes in the tunnel, or try to correlate
the amount and timing of the exit traffic with the traffic at some potential source.
Other nodes in the tunnel are less vulnerable because breaking the encryption
on the message is a difficult problem. The attacker is unlikely to have the resources
to complete this step in a reasonable amount of time. Since this process will take a
long time, it is unlikely the user’s anonymity will matter at that point.
It is also difficult for the attacker to collude with the other nodes in the tunnel.
The attacker will at least need to collude with the first and last node in the tunnel
to determine the sender and receiver. Let’s say an attacker can control c nodes out
of the n nodes in the Tor network. Then the attacker will have a (c/n)2 chance
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of controlling the first and last nodes in the tunnel. As Tor continues to grow its
user base, this probability will only drop. Various groups have looked into ways of
increasing the size of c, and have limited success with this approach. Tor enforces
that each node in the tunnel must be on a separate subnet, so one user with several
thousand hosts or virtual machines will fail. Another group tried to use botnets but
even though they controlled a large part of the network, the botnet’s bandwidth was
not enough to control a large enough portion of the traffic [30].
The last attempt is the most likely to occur within Tor. As in the previous
case, the attacker has a c/n chance of controlling the first node in the tunnel and
the attacker can monitor the website the user is connecting to. If Tor selects a new
entry node for the tunnel for each session, then the attacker will eventually see one
of the sessions. Breaking the user’s anonymity once can have the same consequences
as breaking it every time, so this is a big issue. Tor’s solution to this problem is to
create entry guards, or a set of nodes the user selects at random or by some trust
algorithm to be used as entry points to their tunnels. By fixing the set of entry
nodes to c nodes, the attacker’s probability of controlling an entry node is c/n. As
n increases and c remains constant, the user’s probability of avoiding the attacker’s
attacks increases [32].
2.3 OnionCat
OnionCat creates a VPN within Tor (or I2P) for a closed group of users [21].
OnionCat assigns an IPv6 address to this network making it easy to send any IP based
traffic through the network. This allows us to use any applications that support IPv6
within the Tor network. It also connects us to every user in our group through the
VPN it creates. Alternatively, it could create an open anonymous network for us, but
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our proposed network will have a fixed group of users.
Just like any other VPN, OnionCat encapsulates IP packets within IP packets.
One difference from other VPN’s is OnionCat uses Tor to transmit its data rather
than some data link layer such as Ethernet. Since OnionCat’s virtual circuits are
contained in Tor, our traffic will not have to exit Tor and travel through Tor’s high
traffic exit nodes.
Two users connecting to each other using OnionCat resembles a client con-
necting to a server. One user will be the client and initialize the connection to the
other who accepts it. In Tor, the server is a hidden service, meaning both the server
and client cannot determine the identity and location of the other from the network
connection.
OnionCat allows each user to be both client and server by requiring each user
to set up a hidden service in Tor. This allows any OnionCat user to connect to any
other OnionCat user, provided the user knows the other’s onion-URL. An onion-URL
is Tor’s address for a user’s hidden service and is derived from the user’s private key.
OnionCat forms the user’s IPv6 address with a 48-bit prefix and an 80-bit address
derived from the user’s onion-URL [21]. By using this scheme, it is easy for OnionCat
to translate one address into the other and route traffic into or out of Tor.
2.3.1 Construction of an OnionCat Circuit
OnionCat uses Tor’s hidden services to construct its circuits. Hidden services
in Tor are a way for a user to offer some service anonymously. We will adapt the
previous example of Bob hosting some web page Alice wants to access.
Bob first establishes his web page as a hidden service in Tor. He does this by
creating circuits with several Tor nodes that will be used as introduction points. This
15
Figure 2.3: Example of a circuit in OnionCat
is Tor’s name for the node that will serve as the initial contact node between Alice
and Bob. Bob then registers his hidden service, his introduction points, and a public
key with a distributed hash table among all of Tor’s routers running for more than a
day. Bob needs to sign his registration with his private key to prove he is the owner
of the hidden service.
Alice can now request Bob’s hidden service with its onion-url from the dis-
tributed hash table. Alice also constructs a Tor circuit with one Tor node that will
be used as a rendezvous point by giving it a one-time secret key. This is Tor’s name
for the node that will connect Alice’s circuit with it to Bob’s circuit with it. Alice
then sends a request for Bob’s hidden service through one of the introduction points
with her rendezvous point and her one time secret key.
Bob receives Alice’s request from the introduction point and creates his own
circuit to the rendezvous point. By supplying the rendezvous point with Alice’s one
16
time secret key, the rendezvous point knows to bridge the two circuits together. Alice
can now access Bob’s hidden service and Bob can service her requests while neither
knows who or where the other is.
2.4 Side Channel Attacks
A side channel attack refers to any type of attack which uses knowledge gained
from observations of the system to compromise it [7]. These types of attacks have been
used to compromise both communication networks and cryptographic algorithms, and
have grown more popular as cryptography algorithms have become more robust and
theoretically sound.
A variety of side channel attacks have been developed to determine or reduce
the set of cryptographic keys used in RSA. These attacks depend on information
gained from observing timing information [8], power consumption [24] or electromag-
netic radiation leaks. While these types of attacks could be used to break encryption
in anonymous network to break anonymity, side channel attacks on the anonymous
network have been equally effective.
SSH is vulnerable to side channel attacks based on the delays between packets
corresponding to the delays between user key strokes. Song et al realized that these
delays contained information about the pair of keys and developed a method using
hidden Markov models to predict which key pairs generated the delay [41]. Using this
model, they were effectively able to reduce the search space for passwords entered in
interactive SSH sessions and greatly reduce the time required to find the password.
Similarly, Hintz recognized that individual websites contain identifying char-
acteristics from their resources, such as the sizes of their HTML, CSS, and images.
By creating a profile of websites, it became possible to discover which website a user
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visits even if the site is accessed through HTTPS [22]. This approach has also been
modified to use the size of the search suggestions to determine what a user is typing
into a search bar [12].
The protocol being used to transmit data over the network can also leak infor-
mation. Wright et al developed a side channel attack to identify the protocol or set of
protocols being used in encrypted tunnels. Our focus is to better protect anonymous
networks from this types of side channel attack. It has been shown in [13] that this
type of attack can break the anonymity of anonymous systems.
2.5 Known Attacks on Tor
After Tor’s initial development cycle, researchers have continually been exam-
ining the network to see how it resists or deters different forms of traffic analysis. This
scrutiny has led Tor into a cycle where threats are identified and removed or hindered
in some way. Various researchers developing an attack on the network is a large part
of the identification process. The attacks can be divided into two different groups,
active or passive. Active attacks involve the attacker manipulating the network in
some way, whereas passive attacks do not.
2.5.1 Active Attacks on Tor
One of the first attacks on Tor performed by Murdoch and Danezis used traffic
analysis and congestion [29]. The attacker would flood a Tor router with data and
watch to see which circuits had corresponding delays in their traffic. This attack
assumes the added delay is due to the router processing the extra data from the
attacker and not due to other delays in the circuit. By systematically flooding Tor
routers, it is possible to determine which routers are used for a circuit. In [20], it is
18
shown that this type of attack is no longer possible as the number of Tor routers and
traffic has grown substantially since the attack was first published.
Tor is also subject to application level attacks. Many websites use java-script,
flash, cookies or other content that can request content without going through the
Tor network. Tor has taken steps to eliminate these types of threats by creating a
TorButton which disables many of these features [4]. Tor also suggests a proxy, such
as privoxy or polipo, to direct traffic through Tor [3].
Hackers also pose a threat to Tor. In early January 2010, Tor discovered that
two of its directory servers had been compromised [17]. If the hackers had control of a
majority of the directory servers, then all of Tor’s circuits could be compromised. Tor
has taken steps to improve their security since discovery of this attack. Metasploit
has also released details of an attack patching a Tor server to discover certain types
of traffic and expose those individuals [31].
2.5.2 Passive Attacks on Tor
Zhu et al showed it is possible to correlate the entrance and exit times of Tor
using temporal and frequency domain-based techniques [43, 42]. Traffic flowing into
a router could be matched to traffic flowing out of another router using only the time
a packet arrived or exited. A maximum likelihood approach was used to correlate the
two flows. One weakness of this attack is that it requires attackers to observe each
entry and exit node in Tor.
Craven developed a method similar to Zhu’s but correlates traffic flows leaving
one user and arriving at another [13]. This approach uses hidden Markov models
and confidence intervals to express the relationship between the two flows. Results
from this research shows the attacker can distinguish between different protocols and
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different instances of the same protocol. While this approach does not require the
attacker to observe each entry and exit node in Tor, it does require the attacker to
suspect which two users are communicating beforehand.
Other approaches attempt to break anonymity by exploiting Tor’s path se-
lection algorithm. Murdoch and Watson have found it is possible for an attacker to
control a large portion of Tor’s traffic by controlling a large number of routers, or
claiming large bandwidths [30]. By increasing the amount of traffic under attacker
control, the attacker increases the probability of being the first node in the circuit.
Then the attacker can perform one of the timing attacks mentioned above to deter-
mine the destination. Tor has taken steps to counteract this type of attack by allowing
users to pick a set of entry guards to be the first node in their circuits [11]. Also,
Tor has incorporated a reputation based system into its directory servers to prevent
routers from claiming a large bandwidth to attract a larger portion of traffic [5].
2.6 CSSR Algorithm
The network we are proposing will protect Tor from attacks like Craven’s [13].
This attack uses a version of CSSR (Causal State Splitting and Reconstruction), to
build a HMM (hidden Markov Model) from a discrete series of time stamps. The
algorithm was first proposed by Shalizi and Crutchfield [37, 38] and later refined by
them [40, 39]. Schwier has further improved the algorithm [34, 35].
2.6.1 Original CSSR Algorithm
The algorithm requires the data series from the model we are trying to recon-
struct and the maximum string length to consider, L. The value of L determines how
many previous symbols the current symbol is dependent on. The algorithm begins by
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Figure 2.4: Example of a CSSR generated hidden Markov model
splitting the data series into segments of length L− 1. These represent the different
states of the model. It finds the transition probabilities between the states by simply
counting how often one state transitions to the next. The transient states can then
be removed from the model, as shown in Figure 2.4.
Shalizi makes two important assumptions in the algorithm [37]. First is the
user knows the best value for L, which is the maximum subsequence length consider
when inferring the model. This assumption means the model returned by the algo-
rithm will be the best possible model for the data sequence. The second assumption
is the user has enough data to successfully reconstruct the model, meaning the data
contains enough observations of the states and transitions to generate a statistically
accurate model.
2.6.2 Removing Assumptions from CSSR
Schwier removes the first assumption about L from the algorithm by iteratively
increasing L until the models returned by successive iterations converge [34]. The
models converge when states and transitions of the model match, and when the data
21
produces the same state sequences when traced through each model. By removing
this assumption, no prior knowledge of the system and its parameters is needed to
generate a HMM modeling the system.
The second assumption is impossible to remove unless we have an infinite
amount of data. We will only have finite amounts of data, so we cannot ensure that
there are enough observations of each state and transition. Schwier proposes the
use of the z-test to calculate the statistical confidence of the model. By using this
metric, we can determine the validity of the model or how much more data needs to
be collected to successfully model the system.
2.6.3 Improvements for CSSR
The use of confidence intervals to match data to the model in CSSR makes the
algorithm better for identification purposes [9]. Shalizi had used maximum likelihood
for this purpose in the original algorithm, which is better for classification purposes.
This technique has problems with underflow1, as shown in Figure 2.5. We are using
confidence intervals since it is possible to reject all of the transitions and say the
data does not fit the model. Confidence intervals also allow us to calculate the false
negative rate, at the cost of a slightly higher false positive rate than from maximum
likelihood.
Schwier also determined what the best window size for the data would be [34].
This is of special importance to us since we have no prior knowledge of when the users
might switch protocols. Schwier found that there is a minimum length of data that is
needed to distinguish between two different models, and this minimum length should
be used for the window size. If the window were any smaller, we would be unable to
1The result of the operation is smaller in magnitude than the smallest value representable by the
data type.
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Figure 2.5: Underflow from maximum likelihood
say which model the data matches. If the window were any larger, we would waste
data observations and time noticing the switch between the two models. The window
sizes needed to distinguish between the two models in Figure 2.6 is given in Table 2.1.
Win Size Trans ≤ 5% overlap Trans ≤ 1% overlap Type
15 0 0
16 1 0 Minimum necessary
40 3 1 Minimum sufficient
80 5 3
160 7 5
221 8 7 Maximum sufficient
428 8 8 Maximum necessary
Table 2.1: Transitions required to distinguish between models
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Anonymity is gained by making it harder to distinguish between different
protocols. We constructed a model that increases the variance for different classes of
delay and allows individual delays to be disguised. This chapter explains the model
and its effect on protocol delays in detail.
3.1 New Anonymity Model
The network we propose is an overlay network using OnionCat for its trans-
port layer, which in turn uses Tor for its transport layer. This overlay network will
strengthen the anonymity that Tor provides by eliminating vulnerabilities to some
side channel attacks. The network architecture for our network is shown in Figure 3.1.
The network will create multiple paths from the source to the destination
through several nodes within the network. These nodes will be used in a way similar
to Tor routers in the Tor network. All of these nodes will use OnionCat as a transport
layer. These paths are multiplexed into a single channel that the source can use to
send a stream of packets to the destination, as shown in Figure 3.2. The network will
25
Figure 3.1: Network architecture supporting multiple paths through Tor
choose a random path for each packet it sends over the channel.
By using the OnionCat VPN, it is easy to add or remove nodes from our
network. Further, any node could be a possible source or destination. It is possible
to create a large number of paths through the network with a small number of nodes,
as described in section 3.3. Each of these paths will be characterized by a different
delay as shown in section 3.4. The differences between delays will be added to the
protocol delay and obscure the relationship between the inter-packet departure and
arrival times at the source and destination, as shown in section 3.5.
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Figure 3.2: Multiple paths multiplexed into a single channel
3.2 Classification Error
In any classification problem, the optimal solution labels all samples correctly.
This solution is rarely obtained due to overlap between the various classes of data.




ei × ci (3.1)
where ei is the number class i samples misclassified and ci is the cost per sample
misclassified of class i. When the cost of misclassification is 1 for each class, the
classification error is the number of samples misclassified.
3.2.1 Binary Classifier
Consider a binary classifier which labels samples produced by two Gaussian
processes. Since Gaussian random variables are continuous, the two distributions will
overlap causing some classification error. Also, the cost of misclassifying each sample
is 1 regardless of which Gaussian produces it. To minimize the classification error,
we need to minimize the number of misclassified symbols. We can accomplish this
by assigning each sample to the Gaussian it is most likely from. This is the Gaussian
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Figure 3.3: Classification of two Gaussian random variables
whose pdf is greater at the sample point.
Figure 3.3 shows a graphical representation of the error as the shaded part
under each Gaussian. Due to the mathematical nature of Gaussian random variables,
we can find decision boundary for any pair. Once the decision boundary is known,
we can find the percentage of samples that will be misclassified.
3.2.2 Binary Classifier Error
We begin finding the error by finding the decision boundary for the pair of
Gaussian random variables. The decision boundary is found by finding all points
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where the two probability density functions are equal. This point is at
x =
µ21 − µ22
2 (µ1 − µ2)
(3.2)




2 (σ21 − σ22) ln |σ1/σ2|+ (µ1 − µ2)
2 − (µ1σ22 − µ2σ21)
σ21 − σ22
(3.3)
when the variances differ.
Using the standard score for each distribution we can determine the percent-
age of samples that will be misclassified for each Gaussian. Of more interest, we
can determine the relationship between the mean and variance of the two Gaussian
random variables that will have a small amount of error. For a 5% error rate, 2.5%
of the samples on each end of the Gaussian can be misclassified. A standard score of
±1.96 corresponds to a 2.5% error.
This error rate will be achieved when the relationship between the means and
variances meets the following criteria
|µ2 − µ1| ≥ 3.92σ (3.4)
when the variance of the two Gaussian random variables are the same or
1.96σ1 + µ1 ≤
±σ1σ2
√
2 (σ21 − σ22) ln |σ1/σ2|+ (µ1 − µ2)
2 − (µ1σ22 − µ2σ21)
σ21 − σ22
(3.5)
when they are different. A full derivation of the classification error and the relation-
ship between µ and σ is given in the appendix.
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3.2.3 Applied to Anonymity
By analyzing different protocols and the delays associated with them, we can
determine which anonymous protocols are likely to resist the side channel attack
developed in [13] and provide true anonymity. This analysis also aids development
of future protocols to determine if they will stand up to these types of side channel
attacks.
3.3 Number of Routes to Destination
Our approach also makes side channel attacks more difficult by increasing the
number of routes to the destination. Previously, an attacker watching the receiver’s
incoming traffic would see our communication flow in from a single Tor node. Now,
the attacker will see our communication flow in from multiple Tor nodes, and have
no reliable way to figure out how all the flows are connected.
Each node has a link to every other node, and packets can travel from node
to node until it reaches the receiver. Once a packet has travelled to a node, it cannot
travel back to it. It is useful to understand how the number of nodes will effect the
number of paths from source to receiver. To begin, there will always be the direct
path, which goes directly from the source to the receiver. Then there will be all of
the paths that travel from the source through one intermediate node and then to the
receiver. And then through two intermediate nodes and so on up until all intermediate
nodes are used.
Assume we have n nodes in our system. We can use permutations to calculate
the number of paths of length l. A path travelling through one intermediate node
will have a length of 1 and so forth. For each length l, the number of paths of that
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Nodes Paths of Length l Paths
l=0 l=1 l=2 l=3 l=4 l=5 l=6
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2
2 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 5
3 1 3 6 6 0 0 0 16
4 1 4 12 24 24 0 0 65
5 1 5 30 60 120 120 0 326
6 1 6 30 120 360 720 720 1957






To calculate the total number of paths from source to receiver, we simply add the










The number of paths that result from up to six nodes is given in Table 3.1. The
table also shows how the number of paths grows faster than an exponential. This
characteristic is nice in that it takes only a handful of nodes to produce a large set
of paths.
3.4 Delays of Routes
One of the benefits of having multiple paths from the source to the destination
is that we no longer have to rely on a single path to transmit all of our data. When
using Tor, all of our traffic will flow across a single path through the network. As
such, we can model the delay in the network as a single Gaussian random variable
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Figure 3.4: Number of paths versus number of nodes
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with some delay µ and some variance σ. This model is not the best fit for the delay of
the network, but it was chosen because of the simplicity of adding Gaussian random
variables together and because the simplification favors the attacker. The attacker
will do worse in practice where the heavy-tails cannot be removed.
An attacker can use this delay model to match traffic leaving the sender and
arriving at the destination. This type of attack depends only on the variance of the
network delay. In [13], it has been shown that the variance of delay through a local
Tor network is not large enough to hinder this attack. We have replicated this attack
on our local Tor network and on the global Tor network. Furthermore, if this type of
attack fails using a Gaussian random variable to model the delay, it will fail if some
heavy-tailed model is used.
In our approach, multiple paths are created from the sender to the destination.
The delay of the path will strongly depend on the length of the path. Longer paths will
have a larger average delay and variance than shorter paths because more Gaussian
random variables will be added together. We now have several different paths to
deliver our packets to the destination, but still remain vulnerable to the attack in
[13].
The novelty of our approach is that it will pick a random path to send each
packet to the destination. In a way, we are multiplexing the many paths we have
generated into a single channel to the destination. The benefits of this new channel
is that its delay will have a different mean and variance for consecutive packets.
3.5 Expected Effects on Inter-Packet Times
The channel will also greatly obscure inter-packet arrival times at the destina-
tion. Packets flowing down one path from source to destination have two main factors
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that contribute to the inter-packet arrival times. The first is the delay between pack-
ets in the protocol, and the second is the variance of the channel. The average delay
of the channel has no effect because it is constant for all the packets.
By allowing the delay of the channel to change for each packet, we are adding
a third factor to the inter-packet arrival time. Consider a protocol that has two
distinct delays between packets, µ1 and µ2. We can symbolize these delays as A and
B. Now, consider two different connections, c1 and c2, characterized by a mean and
variance. Let the mean of one channel be µ3 and the mean of the other channel be
µ4 = µ3 + (µ2 − µ1). The difference between the channel delays is the same as the
difference between the protocol delays.
If all of the packets are sent down c1, then we can match the inter-packet
departure times at the source with the inter-packet arrival times at the destination.
If packets choose randomly between c1 and c2, then we will not be able to match these
attributes at the source and destination. This is because the delays associated with
the protocol are not the only delays observed at the destination. The destination will
see the delay from the protocol plus one of four possible delays from the different
combination of channels. These delays are shown in Figure 3.5.
Two of the additive delays from the channel will have a mean of zero, but will
have different variances. These two delays are associated with both packets choosing
the same channel. The other two delays result from packets choosing a different
channel from the previous packet. These delays have a non-zero average delay. One
will be positive and the other negative. Also, one delay is the reflection of the other
across the y-axis.
Going back to the example, the inter-packet departure times at the source will
consist of the symbols A and B. At the destination, the inter-packet arrival times will
consist of the symbols A, B, C and D. Symbol C is symbol A plus the negative non-
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Figure 3.5: Inter-arrival time distributions for 2 paths
zero delay from the channel. Symbol D is symbol B plus the positive non-zero delay
from the channel. The addition of the two extra symbols is not enough to confuse a
smart attacker though.
What will confuse the attacker is packets symbolized by B at the source having
the negative non-zero delay from the channel added and being symbolized by A at
the destination. Similarly, packets symbolized by A at the source can be symbolized
by B at the destination. There are also many other combinations that could result to
confuse the attacker. If we have a large amount of paths from source to destination
with different delays, then it is possible to have any inter-packet departure time
symbol at the source look like any different inter-packet arrival time at the destination.
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3.6 Effects on CSSR Algorithm
In addition to confusing the attacker by allowing certain protocol delays to
look like different protocol delays at the destination, our network will also create
delays not represented in the protocol. These new delays will need to be symbolized
by a new symbol and increase the complexity of the CSSR algorithm. This increase
in complexity affects the attacker in three different ways.
The complexity of CSSR is O(kL+1)+O(N), where k is the size of the alphabet,
L is the maximum subsequence length considered, and N is the size of the input
symbol sequence. Given a stream of symbols γ, of fixed length N , from alphabet A,
the algorithm is linear in the length of the input data set, but exponential in the size
of the alphabet [34].
3.6.1 Increasing the Size of the Alphabet
By allowing packets to travel down different paths to the destination, the
inter-packet delays of the protocol have an additive noise from which path the packet
chose. Since the delays for the paths are different, additional symbols are required to
represent the new observed delays. This increases the base of the exponent, k.
In increasing k, the first term of the complexity equation increases much more
rapidly, meaning it will take the attacker more time to generate the hidden Markov
model for traffic arriving at the destination. In the simple example from section 3.5,
this will double k and the first term will take twice as long to compute.
3.6.2 Increasing the Maximum Subsequence Length
In systems where the inter-packet arrival times are influenced only by the
protocol delays, L is usually 1 or 2. This is because the delays of the packets are
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independent from one another. In our network, the delay observed for one packet will
depend on the delay observed of the previous packet. If packets start arriving out of
order, a packet’s delay could depend on multiple previous packets.
Since the observed packet delays are no longer independent from one another,
the hidden Markov model will not converge until higher subsequence lengths are
calculated. This directly increases the exponent L in the first complexity term and
greatly increases computational time for the attacker.
3.6.3 Increasing the Number of Input Symbols
A side effect of splitting one symbol from the source into multiple symbols
at the destination, is that the attacker will have to collect more data to have the
same level of confidence in the results from the CSSR algorithm. This increases the
amount of time that the attacker will have to monitor traffic at the destination and




This chapter justifies our choice to use Gaussian random variables as models for
delays and gives a detailed description of our process implementing the theoretical
channel developed in Chapter 3. We begin by collecting samples of delay though
OnionCat and comparing them to the standard normal distribution. We finish by
showing the resulting models from the CSSR algorithm produced from running our
new channel with different number of nodes.
4.1 Delays in OnionCat
We are interested in knowing the average network response time and variance
for OnionCat connections. This information will allow us to determine what types of
protocols are vulnerable to timing side-channel attacks and which protocols our new
channel can protect.
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Figure 4.1: Capturing data pings between OnionCat clients
4.1.1 Experimental Setup
The experiment is designed around the network ping tool. Since OnionCat
creates a transparent VPN contained within the Tor network, pings can easily be
sent through the network. Tor blocks ICMP packets so this approach cannot be used
with Tor connections.
To collect the data, we had several clients using OnionCat ping each other
using the network interface associated with OnionCat. The process resembles clients
as connected in Figure 4.1. The global Tor network was used as the transport layer
for OnionCat in these experiments.
4.1.2 Data and Results
Data was collected over three days in the morning, afternoon and evening.
The response times were heavy tailed as expected with an average time of 3145 ms,
median time of 1916 ms and variance of 4740 ms. The data for the nine collections
is given in Table 4.1. The data samples from the first collection are also normalized
as compared to the standard normal distribution in Figure 4.2.












Table 4.1: OnionCat Response Times (ms)
Figure 4.2: Normalized OnionCat Ping Times Compared to Standard Normal Distri-
bution
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times differ by up to 164 milliseconds. These differences will obscure the delays of
the protocol and destroy the correlation between inter-packet times at the source and
destination. We can use our delay model and variance from the collected data to
determine the minimum separation needed between protocol delays for timing side
channel attacks to be successful. If the protocol delays do not have enough separation,
the variance of the network connection through OnionCat will be enough to prevent
timing side channel attacks. We will increase the amount of separation further when
testing our channel to account for variance in the protocol delay.
Figure 4.2 also suggests our Gaussian model for network delay is acceptable.
The collected data fails tests comparing it to the normal distribution, such as the
χ2 or Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. If we ignore the heavy tail of the data, the model
fits the data better. We can use our model to calculate the upper bound for the
attacker’s success rate. In practice, the attacker will do worse than this bound since
the attacker cannot ignore the heavy tail found in the data.
4.2 Testing Our Channel
4.2.1 Experimental Setup
The experiment uses the private local Tor network as the network layer for
OnionCat. Nodes are connected as shown in Figure 3.1. All of the nodes are running
OnionCat to connect to the other nodes. We have designated two nodes to act as
the source and the sink and up to three other nodes to serve as different nodes in the
paths. All of the possible paths are then constructed for the set of nodes.
The source generates a stream of packets to send to the sink using the protocol
shown in Figure 4.3. The delays for each transition are given in Table 4.2. Each packet
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Figure 4.3: 5 state model used for delay
is transmitted on a random path to the sink. The sink’s only function is to receive
the traffic. No requests or replies are sent back to the source.
We observe two traffic streams, one exiting the source and the other arriving
at the sink. The traffic stream at the source depends only on protocol delays and the
traffic stream at the sink depends on protocol delays and network delays. The timing
side-channel attack is run to attempt to correlate the two streams. If the streams
cannot be correlated, our channel has provided protection against the attack. The
stream at the sink is also compared to the delay model to determine if the protocol








Table 4.2: Delays used by sender (ms)
4.2.2 Data Capture
Data is captured using Wireshark, a network protocol analyzer that allows the
user to both capture and browse network traffic at the packet level. Alternatively,
tshark may be used. tshark is the command line version of Wireshark.
OnionCat creates a tun or tap network interface for applications to use. We
configure Wireshark to capture all traffic on this interface and filter out the packets
of length zero. This removes any ACK packets that are present in the stream. We
can further filter based on port number of IPv6 address if necessary.
Wireshark will output the timestamps for each packet in seconds from the
start of the data capture. We can then convert these timestamps into the inter-packet
arrival or departure times necessary for the side channel attack.
4.2.3 Results with Zero Nodes
When no nodes are used to build paths, only the direct path from source to
sink exists. The delays at the source correspond to the delays of the protocol. The
delays at the sink correspond to the delays of the protocol plus some network delay.
Since there is only one path, there is only one random variable characterizing the
network delay. The effects of this delay can be seen in Figure 4.4.
Since the sink is not transmitting anything back to the source, inter-packet
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Figure 4.4: Inter-packet delays with 0 nodes
arrival times at the sink can be symbolized as shown in Table 4.2. The model re-
constructed from the inter-packet delays leaving the source looks very much like the
model shown in Figure 4.3. This symbolization and source model is used for each
test case presented below. The model reconstructed from the inter-packet delays ar-
riving at the sink is shown in Figure 4.5. There are some low probability transitions
in this model due to the variance of the channel or Tor reconstructing its circuits.
These transitions may be pruned out of the model since they correspond to such a
low percentage of the traffic.
The acceptance rate is the percentage of windows that match at the source
and the sink and have a path through the model. Since the model is derived directly
from the protocol being used to transmit the data at the source, 100% of the windows
observed at the source will have a path through the model. This means our channel
will not hide the protocol the source is using to transmit data. It also means the
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Figure 4.5: Reconstructed model from received delays with 0 nodes
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Rate w = 2 w = 4 w = 8 w = 16
Acceptance 0.9320 0.8947 0.8276 0.7046
Rejection 0.0680 0.1053 0.1724 0.2954
Table 4.3: Acceptance and rejection rates with 0 nodes
acceptance rate only depends on how many windows at the sink don’t have a path
through the model. The rejection rate is the percentage of windows that do not match
or do not have a path through the model.
The acceptance and rejection rates with 0 nodes is shown in Table 4.3 for
different window sizes. Our channel with 0 nodes is the direct path from source to
sink through OnionCat. As expected, it is vulnerable to timing side-channel attacks.
4.2.4 Results with One Intermediate Node
When one intermediate node is used to build paths, two paths from source
to sink exist. The delays at the source correspond to the delays of the protocol.
The delays at the sink correspond to the delays of the protocol plus some network
delay. In this case, there are two random variables characterizing the network delay.
There are four different ways these delays can be added to consecutive packets to
produce different observed delays at the sink. The effects of this delay can be seen in
Figure 4.6.
The model reconstructed from the inter-packet delays arriving at the sink is
shown in Figure 4.7. The low probability transitions in this model are slightly higher
than the corresponding transitions in Figure 4.5. This suggests that the differences
in delays from different paths through the network affect the delays present in the
protocol. These transitions account for less than 5% of the total traffic and may be
pruned out of the model.
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Figure 4.6: Inter-packet delays with 1 node
Rate w = 2 w = 4 w = 8 w = 16
Acceptance 0.9015 0.8245 0.6955 0.4968
Rejection 0.0985 0.1755 0.3045 0.5032
Table 4.4: Acceptance and rejection rates with 1 node
The acceptance and rejection rates with 1 node is shown in Table 4.4. Our
channel with 1 intermediate node is still vulnerable to timing side-channel attacks.
The acceptance rate does fall slightly suggesting more nodes are needed to provide
better anonymity.
4.2.5 Results with Two Intermediate Nodes
When two intermediate nodes are used to build paths, five paths from source
to sink exist. The delays at the source correspond to the delays of the protocol. The
delays at the sink correspond to the delays of the protocol plus some network delay. In
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Figure 4.7: Reconstructed model from received delays with 1 node
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Figure 4.8: Inter-packet delays with 2 nodes
this case, there are five random variable characterizing the network delay. There are
25 different ways these delays can be added to consecutive packets to produce different
observed delays at the sink. The effects of this delay can be seen in Figure 4.8.
The model reconstructed from the inter-packet delays arriving at the sink
is shown in Figure 4.9. Some of the low probability transitions in this model are
slightly higher than the corresponding transitions in Figure 4.7. These transitions
now account for a more significant amount of the traffic and cannot be pruned from
the model. They show how the delays added from packets taking different paths
obscure some of the protocol delays.
The acceptance and rejection rates with 2 nodes is shown in Table 4.5. Our
channel with 2 intermediate nodes does a good job of protecting users from timing
side-channel attacks. The acceptance rate is just over 50% for the smallest window
length. The difference between delays for paths of length 0 and paths of length 2 is
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Figure 4.9: Reconstructed model from received delays with 2 nodes
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Rate w = 2 w = 4 w = 8 w = 16
Acceptance 0.5247 0.2606 0.0809 0.0084
Rejection 0.4753 0.7394 0.9191 0.9916
Table 4.5: Acceptance and rejection rates with 2 nodes
large enough to make one delay look like another. At this point, packets also started
arriving out of order at the sink.
4.2.6 Results with Three Intermediate Nodes
When three intermediate nodes are used to build paths, 16 paths from source
to sink exist. The delays at the source correspond to the delays of the protocol.
The delays at the sink correspond to the delays of the protocol plus some network
delay. In this case, there are 16 random variable characterizing the network delay.
There are 256 different ways these delays can be added to consecutive packets to
produce different observed delays at the sink. The effects of this delay can be seen in
Figure 4.10.
The model reconstructed from the inter-packet delays arriving at the sink
is shown in Figure 4.11. Most of the low probability transitions in Figure 4.5 are
significantly higher in this model. These transitions now account for an even more
significant amount of the traffic and cannot be pruned from the model. They show
how the delays added from packets taking different paths obscure many of the protocol
delays.
The acceptance and rejection rates with 3 intermediate nodes is shown in
Table 4.6. Our channel with 3 intermediate nodes does a better job of protecting users
from timing side-channel attacks. The acceptance rate is under 50% for the smallest
window size. The difference between delays is large enough to make delays for one
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Figure 4.10: Inter-packet delays with 3 nodes
Rate w = 2 w = 4 w = 8 w = 16
Acceptance 0.4284 0.1515 0.0260 0.0013
Rejection 0.5716 0.9485 0.9740 0.9987
Table 4.6: Acceptance and rejection rates with 3 nodes
symbol look like another and make many packets arrive out of order. While reordering
the packets at the sink is not a challenging problem, it does present difficulties for the
attacker seeing two delays in the protocol represented as a single delay at the sink.
4.2.7 Overview of Results
It is clear from the histograms in Figures 4.4, 4.6, 4.8, and 4.10 that a small
number of nodes removes the crisp distinctions between protocol delays observed at
the source. This can also be seen in the smallest transition probabilities in Figure 4.5
increasing as more intermediate nodes are added.
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Figure 4.11: Reconstructed model from received delays with 3 nodes
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Nodes w = 2 w = 4 w = 8 w = 16
n = 0 0.9320 0.8947 0.8276 0.7046
n = 1 0.9015 0.8245 0.6955 0.4968
n = 2 0.5247 0.2606 0.0809 0.0084
n = 3 0.4284 0.1515 0.0260 0.0013
Table 4.7: Acceptance rates for up to 3 nodes
Nodes w = 2 w = 4 w = 8 w = 16
n = 0 0.0680 0.1053 0.1724 0.2954
n = 1 0.0985 0.1755 0.3045 0.5032
n = 2 0.4753 0.7394 0.9191 0.9916
n = 3 0.5716 0.9485 0.9740 0.9987
Table 4.8: Rejection rates for up to 3 nodes
The falling acceptance rates and rising rejection rates also support our channel
providing anonymity to the users. The acceptance rate is the percentage of window
pairs that match and have a path through the model. This represents the attacker’s
ability to correlate packets leaving the source and arriving at the sink. There are
two possible reasons for a pair of windows to be rejected. The first is that the model
cannot handle the symbol string in the window, and the second is that the windows
do not match each other.
The acceptance rate falls as the window increases because the same corrupted
symbol is present in more windows. Over 90% of the windows are accepted with a
window length of 2 and 1 or 0 nodes. When 2 or more intermediate nodes are used,
then the acceptance rate falls drastically to around 50% or less.
As the acceptance rate falls, the rejection rate increases. The rejection rate is
the percentage of window pairs that are different or do not have a path through the
model. This represents the percentage of windows that the attacker cannot correlate
between the source and sink.
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Figure 4.12: Acceptance rates versus number of nodes
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Figure 4.13: Rejection rates versus number of nodes
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4.3 Implementation Concerns
The attacker must not be able to determine which path a packet is travelling
on, or distinguish between packets travelling to the same node but on different paths
when it leaves the source or arrives at the sink. To protect against this, a small
number of entry guards should be used to ensure each path does not have a different
first hop. Since Tor encrypts the remainder of the path, this should prevent the
attacker from determining the path of a packet. This works at both the source and
sink because OnionCat uses Tor’s hidden services, and both source and sink build a
Tor circuit to the rendezvous point.
If the attacker is able to separate one path from all of the other paths, the
attacker will be able to perform the timing side channel attack on this path. Each
individual path is vulnerable to this type of attack because the network delay is
similar for each packet. Also, the delays between packets will be increased since the
path does not transmit every packet from the protocol. When three intermediate
nodes are used to form paths, this link will carry around 6.25% of the total traffic,
but this amount is enough to compromise the user’s anonymity. The communication






In this work, we examined why low-latency anonymous networks are vulnera-
ble to timing side-channel attacks and investigate ways to eliminate these vulnerabil-
ities. Custom client, server, and forwarding programs using OnionCat and a private
Tor network provide the experimental foundation for our work. We showed how a
collection of paths can protect this network from timing side-channel attacks.
We determined we could use Gaussian random variables to model the delays
in the network. This model ignores the heavy tail, which attackers cannot ignore
when physically performing the attack. The results from our mathematical models
represent the best case scenario for the attacker. In practice, the attacker will perform
worse.
The inter-packet delay signatures at the source and sink were physically cap-
tured from our implementation. We collected data with various number of nodes
helping to form the paths from source to sink. This data was used by the timing
side-channel attack. The results showed how increasing the number of nodes made it
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more difficult to correlate the signatures at the source and sink. The effects of adding
each node to our channel was also determined.
We found that this type of channel can help strengthen anonymity in low-
latency anonymous networks from both local and global adversaries. The channel
requires a small number of nodes to produce this anonymity and does not increase the
latency considerably. This channel could be integrated into the anonymous network
or implemented as an overlay network.
5.2 Recommendations for Further Research
In the process of creating this channel, many interesting ideas and questions
came to mind that could not be investigated due to time constraints. These ideas
and questions are mentioned here and quickly discussed.
Perhaps the easiest question to answer is how much additional latency would
this channel contribute to the anonymous network per node used? Similarly, how
many nodes can be used before the extra latency makes the network tedious to use?
Various studies have examined how long users are willing to wait for interactive
content. We could use these studies to better understand how our channel will impact
the network’s usability.
Studying the channel’s effects on other protocols is another research area.
The protocols examined in this work were all artificially created. We could determine
what types of protocols and applications would be vulnerable, and which ones our
channel can help protect. Any application using TCP could be studied with Tor, but
OnionCat would be necessary to study IP based applications.
We can also look at our channel from the attacker’s perspective, and find what
types of attacks our channel is vulnerable to. We know it helps protect against timing
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side-channel attacks, but there are many other possible types of attacks. Could one of
these attacks remove the anonymity provide by our channel? This different viewpoint
can help us determine new vulnerable areas in anonymous communication networks




Appendix A Derivation of Classification Error
Consider a binary classifier that classifies elements as belonging to one of
two normal distributions. The classification error can be minimized by choosing the
intersection of the two distributions as the classification boundary. In this appendix,
a mathematical derivation is given to find the classification boundary and determine
what the error rate is.
A.1 Deriving the Classification Boundary







where µ is the mean and σ is the variance of the random variable. The intersections











































































































2 (σ21 − σ22) ln |σ1/σ2|+ (µ1 − µ2)






2 (µ1 − µ2)
(4)
when the variance for the two distributions are equal.
All observations less than the classification boundary will be classified as one
distribution, and all observations greater than it will be classified as the other. When
following this rule, observations will be assigned to the class they most likely belong
to. This approach can be used to find the classification boundaries between multiple
normal distributions as well.
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A.2 Deriving the Classification Error per Class
Once the classification boundary is known for the distributions, the expected





By converting the classification boundary to one on the standard normal distribution,
the number of misclassified elements can be looked up or calculated. The calculation
is








when z is negative or








when z is positive. For a 5% error rate, 2.5% of each class can be misclassified. This
assumes the left and right tails of each class will overlap with some other class and
are misclassified. The standard score that corresponds to this error rate is ±1.96
By enforcing the criteria of
|z| ≥ 1.96 (7)
the relationship between the mean and variance of the two distributions can be de-
termined. The 5% error rate will hold when
|µ2 − µ1| ≥ 3.92σ (8)
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when the variances are equal or
1.96σ1 + µ1 ≤
±σ1σ2
√
2 (σ21 − σ22) ln |σ1/σ2|+ (µ1 − µ2)




1.96σ2 + µ2 ≤
±σ1σ2
√
2 (σ21 − σ22) ln |σ1/σ2|+ (µ1 − µ2)
2 − (µ1σ22 − µ2σ21)
σ21 − σ22
when the variances are different.
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